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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ROBERT HAL OLSEN, JR. 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030902CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third 
degree felony (R. 1-2). This court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by sentencing 
defendant to the statutory prison term on a third degree felony 
conviction? 
A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial 
court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all legally 
relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally 
prescribed limits. State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 
1989)(citations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has noted that 
"[T]he exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects 
the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can 
properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable 
[person] would take the view adopted by the trial court." State 
v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App. 417, 16, 82 P.3d 211 (quoting State v. 
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah -1978)(quotations omitted; 
alternations in original)) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203, governing indeterminite terms of 
imprisonment for felony convictions, states: 
A person who has been convicted of a felony 
may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as follows: 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third 
degree, unless the statute provides 
otherwise, for a term not to exceed five 
years. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 {2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was originally charged with one count of 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with 
intent to distribute, a second degree felony (R. 1-2). The 
charge was later amended to possession of a controlled substance, 
a third degree felony (Id.). Defendant entered a no contest plea 
to the reduced charge (R. 19-24). The court decreased 
defendant's bail from $10,000 to $5000 and referred defendant to 
Adult Probation and Parole for a presentence investigation report 
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(R. 16, 19-24). Defendant subsequently failed to appear for 
sentencing, and the court issued a no bail arrest warrant (R. 26, 
30). Two weeks later, defendant appeared in court and was 
sentenced to zero to five years in prison, with credit for time 
served (R. 31-32). This timely appeal followed (R. 34). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Because defendant waived his preliminary hearing and the 
case did not go to trial, the record facts are necessarily 
limited. The responding officer provided the following factual 
account in his probable cause affidavit: 
Called to a D[omestic] V[iolence] in progress 
at 29th and Jefferson. Suspect reported to 
be leaving east on 29th. Noticed [defendant] 
walking fast at 29th & Jackson. Asked him to 
stop and asked him his name. He ran and 
threw a quarter ounce of methamphetamine and 
had individual baggies consistent w/selling. 
R. 9. At the plea hearing, the State provided the following 
undisputed factual basis for defendant's no contest plea: 
The police were called to a domestic • ' ' ' 
disturbance. When they got there, the 
defendant was leaving the scene. And they 
tried to stop him to talk to him about what 
happened, and he ran and threw something that 
they retrieved and discovered [it] was a 
quarter ounce of methamphetamine. 
R. 43 at 5. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the sentencing court abused its 
discretion by failing to consider all legally relevant sentencing 
factors and, consequently, imposing an excessive sentence. For 
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this argument, defendant relies on State v. Gallic 967 P.2d 930 
(Utah 1998). 
Defendant's reliance is misplaced. Galli is a consecutive 
sentencing case, governed by the statute regulating imposition of 
consecutive sentences. This case involves a single charge and a 
single sentence. Galli does not apply. 
The court here sentenced defendant within the statutory 
limits for the crime to which he entered his plea. Moreover, 
even considering the factors defendant highlights, the court 
still retained the discretion to send him to prison rather than 
order probation. A trial court has no obligation to favor 
rehabilitation over punishment. Where the trial court followed 
the law, it cannot be said that uno reasonable [person] would 
take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Gerrard, 584 
P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). Consequently, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY SENTENCING HIM TO THE 
STATUTORY SENTENCE ON A THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
by failing to consider "all the legally relevant factors" and, 
consequently, by imposing an "excessive sentence" of zero to five 
years in prison on a third degree felony conviction. Br. of 
Aplt. at 11. Specifically, defendant contends that the trial 
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court did not consider either his rehabilitative needs or his 
criminal history. See id. at 12-13. According to defendant, had 
the trial court properly weighed these factors, it would not have 
sentenced him to prison. Id. at 15. For this proposition, 
defendant relies wholly on State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 
1998) . 
Defendant's argument fails because he is applying the wrong 
law to the facts of his case. State v. Galli is a consecutive 
sentencing case, governed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401. In that 
case, the supreme court reversed the trial court's imposition of 
consecutive sentences because the court did not properly consider 
certain statutory factors before imposing consecutive sentences. 
Id. at 938-39. This case, however, does not involve consecutive 
sentencing. Defendant here was convicted of a single felony and 
received a single sentence. The law applicable to consecutive 
sentencing does not apply to this case. 
Defendant's case is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203, 
governing indeterminite terms of imprisonment for felony 
convictions. It provides: 
A person who has been convicted of a felony 
may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as follows: 
(3) In the case of a felony of the third 
degree, unless the statute provides 
otherwise, for a term not to exceed five 
years. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203. 
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Here, the trial court sentenced defendant to the statutory 
term for a third degree felony. Such a sentence, on its face, 
does not constitute an abuse of discretion. See Gerrard, 584 
P.2d at 887-88. 
Moreover, defendant has not included the presentence 
investigation-report as part of the record on appeal. See Utah 
R. Criiti. P. 21.5(b) (burdening defendant with responsibility of 
notifying court clerk that presentence investigation report 
should be made part of the record on appeal). Under such 
circumstances, this Court must presume the correctness of the 
disposition below. State v. Rawlinqs, 829 P.2d 150, 152-53 (Utah 
App. 1992). This presumption includes the trial court's 
consideration of both defendant's rehabilitative needs and his 
criminal history, typically included within the presentence 
investigation report. 
In any event, even considering defendant's rehabilitative 
needs and his criminal history, the court retained the discretion 
to send defendant to prison rather than to follow the 
recommendation of Adult Probation and Parole. See State v. Houk, 
906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1995)(trial court not bound by AP&P 
recommendations); State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 
1957) (''Probation is not a matter of right, and this is so no 
matter how unsullied a reputation one convicted of a crime may be 
able to demonstrate to the trial judge"). Rather, "the court is 
empoweired to place the defendant on probation if it thinks that 
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will best serve the ends of justice and is compatible with the 
public interest." State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah 
App. 1991)(citation omitted). 
Here, the trial court knew not only that defendant had been 
convicted of possession of methamphetamine, but also that he had 
in his possession a quantity of baggies consistent with 
distribution of the drug. See R. 9, R. 43: 6; State v. Lipsky, 
639 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1981) (sentencing court may rely on 
information from varied sources). With undisputed information 
before it, the trial court determined that imposing a prison term 
represented a more just disposition than probation. See, e.g.. 
State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 458 (Utah App. 1993) (no abuse of 
discretion where trial court emphasized punishing defendant 
rather than rehabilitating him); State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 
117-19 (Utah 1985) (recognizing that sentencing judges generally 
give considerable weight to circumstances of crime). Such a 
disposition is well within the discretion of a sentencing court. 
On appeal, this Court should exercise great restraint in 
overturning the trial court's determination. The trial court was 
in the most advantaged position to make the highly 
individualistic assessment required to fashion a just sentence. 
See State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997) (sentencing 
"necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court" 
(quotations and citation omitted)). Certainly, the sentencing 
court's assessment of defendant's character may have been based 
-7-
at least partially on its personal observation of defendant's 
body language, demeanor, and tone of voice, none of which are 
reflected in the record on appeal. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 939 (Utah 1994). 
In this case, the trial court evaluated the evidence, 
exercised its discretion within the bounds of the law, and 
imposed a proper statutory penalty for the offense to which 
defendant entered his plea. Because it cannot be said that "no 
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial 
court," the court did not abuse its discretion. Gerrard, 584 
P.2d at 887. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction for one count of possession of a controlled substance, 
a third degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this \0 day of June, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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